Program Profile: Operation Impact (Newark, New Jersey)

This was a saturation foot-patrol initiative implemented in Newark, N.J., in 2008 that aimed to reduce violent crime. The program is rated Promising. The target area that implemented the initiative experienced statistically significant reductions in overall violence and incidences of aggravated assault and shootings, compared with the control area. However, there was no statistically significant effect on incidences of murder or robbery.

A Promising rating implies that implementing the program may result in the intended outcome(s).

Program Goals

Operation Impact was a saturation foot-patrol initiative implemented in Newark, New Jersey. In 2006, the Newark Police Department underwent several changes in its overall strategy and mission. The primary strategy against violence became proactive enforcement that targeted street-level disorder and the illicit narcotics trade. The agency provided more coverage on nighttime and weekend shifts and committed to a place-based approach in its crime-prevention efforts. Operation Impact was launched in June 2008 and represented the agency’s placed-based strategy.

Program Activities

The design and enforcement strategy of Operation Impact was based on the New York (City) Police Department program of the same name (Smith and Purtell 2007). The initiative primarily involved 12 officers (under the supervision of three supervisors) patrolling a quarter-square-mile area of the city on a nightly basis. This represented an increase in police presence in the target area, as typically two officers would patrol Newark’s police sectors (averaging approximately three-square miles in size).

The foot patrols were deployed as a deterrence mechanism. People who would otherwise consider committing an offense would notice an increased risk of apprehension because of the strengthened presence of police. In addition, officers engaged in proactive enforcement actions that were expected to disrupt street-level disorder and narcotics activity in violence-prone areas. During the implementation of Operation Impact, the unit engaged in 3,186 specific enforcement actions, including 634 arrests, 1,202 quality of life summonses, and 1,350 field interrogations.

Target Sites

Newark is New Jersey’s largest city, stretching almost 25 square miles, with a population of almost 280,000 persons (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). The target area of Operation Impact was in Newark’s Fourth Precinct. This area was selected based on an in-depth analysis of the spatial distribution of street violence. The analysis examined incidents of murder, nonfatal shootings, aggravated assaults, and robbery that occurred from Jan. 1, 2005, through Dec. 31, 2007.

In Newark’s Fourth Precinct, the thoroughfare of South Orange Avenue stretches east to west across the center of the area. Along this main corridor are numerous apartment buildings, assorted business types (e.g., liquor and retail establishments), and many intersecting streets. A large housing complex is located in the eastern portion of the target area, consisting of 28 low-rise buildings situated in a particular fashion that forms a maze-like network of streets and walkways.

Key Personnel

The officers and supervisors involved in Operation Impact comprised a special unit dedicated exclusively to patrolling the target area. The 12 officers were assigned to Operation Impact upon their graduation from the police academy. They remained on that detail until graduates from the ensuing academy class were selected as their successors. The supervisors (two sergeants and one lieutenant) were selected based on their levels of experience managing proactive enforcement units.

Additional Information

Operation Impact lasted roughly 2 years. However, in 2010, the Newark Police Department phased out Operation Impact because of severe cuts to the department’s budget and personnel.

Study

Piza and O’Hara (2012) used a quasi-experimental design to evaluate Operation Impact. Data was collected from the Newark (N.J.) Police Department’s geographic information system on incidents of murder, robbery, aggravated assault, shootings, and overall violence. The 1-year pre-implementation period included crime incidents from June 4, 2007, through June 3, 2008. The 1-year implementation period included crime incidents from June 4, 2008, through June 3, 2009.

Crime incidents were measured within four areas: the target area, a surrounding catchment area, and two different control areas. The target area of Operation Impact was in Newark’s Fourth Precinct. The catchment area was an area extending approximately one block in each direction from the target area. The first control area was the Fourth Precinct minus the target area and surrounding catchment area. This control area included areas unrelated to Operation Impact that were primarily policed through standard law enforcement methods, such as routine patrols. The second control area was “Zone B,” which was a prospective target area identified through the target selection stage. It was selected as the second control area because it had the second-highest violent crime total of the five prospective target areas (making the violent crime problem comparable with the target area), and the geographic layout of Zone B was similar to that of the target area. Zone B was policed through numerous place-based strategies that were somewhat similar to Operation Impact but that also differed in many ways (for example, focused-patrol and street-level narcotics operations occurred on an intermittent basis in Zone B). Thus, Operation Impact’s intensive foot-patrol approach was compared with tactics specific to the two control areas: intermittent, placed-based enforcement in Zone B and standard responses to crime in the precinct. The CrimeSolutions review of this study focused on the differences between the target area where Operation Impact was implemented and the control area of the surrounding precinct that implemented standard responses to crime.

The effect of Operation Impact was reported as an odds ratio, which indicates the proportional change in crime in the control area compared with the target area. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates a desirable effect on crime in the target area relative to the control area, while an odds ratio less than 1 indicates an undesirable effect. The authors also conducted additional analyses to examine the differences in outcomes between the target area where Operation Impact was implemented and Zone B, the control area where intermittent, place-based enforcement was implemented.

The evaluation had a few limitations. First, the study was unable to measure the residual effect of Operation Impact, and earlier research has shown that certain placed-based interventions produce initial crime reductions only to have the deterrence effect fade over time (Mazerolle, Hurley, and Chamlin 2002). In addition, there were a small number of incidents in the target area (compared with the precinct control area) that may have contributed to the positive success measures.

Subgroup Analysis

Piza and O’Hara (2012) conducted additional analyses to examine the differences between the target area that implemented Operation Impact and the Zone B control area that implemented intermittent, place-based enforcement. There were reductions in overall violence and aggravated assaults in the target area, compared with Zone B, at the postintervention follow-up. These differences were statistically significant. However, there were no statistically significant differences found between the target area and Zone B in incidents of murder, robbery, or shootings at the postintervention follow-up.

These sources were used in the development of the program profile:

These sources were used in the development of the program profile:

Following are CrimeSolutions-rated programs that are related to this practice:

Street-Level Drug Law Enforcement

This practice includes targeted-policing approaches for reducing drug and drug-related offenses. This practice is rated Promising in reducing reported, drug-related calls for services and offenses against persons. This practice is rated Ineffective in reducing reported property offenses, public order calls for service, and total offenses.

Evidence Ratings for Outcomes

	Crime & Delinquency - Drug and alcohol offenses
	Crime & Delinquency - Violent offenses
	Crime & Delinquency - Property offenses
	Crime & Delinquency - Public order offenses
	Crime & Delinquency - Multiple crime/offense types

Why might a practice's outcome ratings differ from the ratings of specific programs encompassed by that practice?